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Abstract
In this study, we analyze whether the mere volume of presence in mass
media and the mere volume of activity on social media convey advantages
to candidates in parliamentary elections. Based on the theoretical model of
bounded rationality, we call these potential effects brute force effects. During
the last month of the election campaign of the Swiss federal election of 2015,
we have tracked the presence of all 873 candidates in the canton of Zurich,
the most populous canton, in a broad sample of mass media. Additionally,
we have tracked those candidates’ activity on Facebook and Twitter. The
results of our multilevel Bayesian estimates show that mass media presence
has a consistent non-trivial impact on different aspects of electoral outcome.
Furthermore, social media activity also has a non-trivial impact, but only in
terms of resonance (reactions to candidates’ social media activity). Overall,
our results suggest that brute force effects of of mass media presence and
social media activity can have substantial impact on voting behavior.
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1 Introduction: Mass media presence and social
media activity as brute force effects
To note that, during election times, public communication about the election
campaign matters is a truism that verges on the trivial. From the point of view of
the political actors who are seeking office, being present in the public discourse is
quite obviously a goal – after all, political actors have to mobilize their supporters
as well as persuade other potential voters in the hopes of turning them into
supporters (Rohrschneider 2002; Nimmo 2001). From the voters’ point of view,
public communication about the campaign is welcome, because it provides them
with information that is necessary in order for them to decide which candidates and
parties are best aligned with their own preferences (Gelman and King 1993; K. M.
Hansen and Pedersen 2014; Nadeau et al. 2008). From a systemic, democratic point
of view, public discourse about electoral campaigns is welcome as well, because,
ideally, some rational discourse about the quality of different policy proposals will
take place (Habermas 2006).
Possibly for as long as modern representative democracy has existed, the most
important venue of public communication during election campaigns have been
professional mass media news outlets. Mass media do not, of course, exhaust the
whole conceptual space of public communication, but functionally, they serve as
a master forum (Ferree 2002, p. 10) where communication flows about relevant
issues aggregate. In electoral campaigns, the master forum of the mass media plays
a crucial role, not least because a large and relevant proportion of the electorate
– essentially, what is sometimes referred to as the the median voter (Black 1948;
Downs 1957) – can be addressed via mass media. Research on the role of news
media during elections is plentiful, and a number of effects of news media coverage
have been observed, mostly hovering around the questions of what and how the
media report during electoral campaigns, and how that reporting impacts voter
attitudes. Some prominent venues of research include research on the dynamics
of agenda-setting and framing (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007), research on the
reputational consequences of news media reporting in the form of issue-ownership
(Petrocik 1996), and research on the nature of the journalistic output in campaign
times (Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn 2004). One potentially important aspect
of the news media during elections, however, receives relatively little attention,
as Hopmann, Vliegenthart, et al. (2010) note: The question whether the mere
volume of candidate visibility, or presence, in the news media has an impact on
electoral outcomes. To some degree, it is understandable that his question receives
little scientific attention. While research on phenomena such as, for example, the
aforementioned framing and issue ownership effects focuses on effects that are
contingent on the properties of mass media output, possible effects of the sheer
volume of mass media content seem less of a sophisticated effect.
The traditional news media are not the only venue of public communication
in election times. Campaigning events, billboards (Seidman 2008), cold calling
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(Nickerson 2006; Nickerson 2007) and direct mail (Green and Gerber 2015) have
long been, and still are, staple methods of campaigning. These venues of public
campaign communication have been supplemented by social media. Social media,
understood as Internet-based applications that allow for the creation and exchange
of user-generated content (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010), provide candidates with the
opportunity to reach significant parts of the public without there being gatekeepers,
such as journalists, who wield veto power over the information flows and contents.
The goal of this study is to further explore whether the volume of candidate
presence in traditional mass media and the volume of candidate activity on social
media have an impact on candidates’ electoral fortunes. We call the impact of
mass media presence and of social media activity brute force effects. We analyze
the brute force effects with the following two research questions:
• RQ1 : Does candidates’ presence in the mass media have an effect on their
electoral success?
• RQ2 : Does candidates’ activity on social media have an effect on their
electoral success?
We analyze these questions in the context of the 2015 Swiss federal election,
which took place on October 18, 2015. Our study adds to the existing literature in
three ways. First, we include not only social media in our study, but a rather large
sample of traditional mass media as well, since mass media most certainly still
matter. Second, we aim to embed our study in a broader theory of voter behavior.
Third, the peculiarities of the Swiss electoral system are a very fertile ground for
conducting this study, because the expected effects can be measured in great detail.
2 Voter preferences and electoral campaigns
Our overarching theoretical model of voters is one of rational voters. We believe
that, generally, voters have preferences, and they act in accordance with their
preferences so as to achieve what they want to achieve. This is, in a nutshell, the
rational choice model of voting behavior (Shepsle 2010). But we don’t believe that
voters are perfectly rational in their behavior, and thus, we don’t believe a model
of perfect rational choice to be appropriate in the context of voting. Of course, the
idea that a pure model of rational choice does not fit reality all that well is not
new (Simon 1955). In contemporary research on rational choice, there is broad and
uncontested consensus that the insights of behavioral economics (Mullainathan and
Thaler 2000) about erroneous inference and decision-making do not represent a
deviation from regular human cognition, but rather, they demonstrate that regular
human cognition is fundamentally error prone.
Given such a behavioral economics view of human cognition, our understanding
of voter behavior is one of bounded rationality (Jones 1999). Generally, voters are
rational in that they have preferences and act in line with their preferences in the
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act of voting. But voters’ cognitive apparatus makes use of cognitive heuristics
to process information, to make inferences about the world, and to partly base
decisions – specifically, the act of voting – on those heuristics.
There are many cognitive heuristics that affect inference- and decision. In the
context of the present study, one particular heuristic is of interest: The so-called
mere exposure effect (Zajonc 1968; Zajonc 2001; Harmon-Jones and Allen 2001;
J. Hansen and Wänke 2009). The mere exposure effect describes the tendency
for humans to develop a positive attitude towards information, objects or people
merely by being exposed to that information, those objects, or those people. Mere
exposure effects can manifest in many different contexts, not least in the context of
elections (Verhulst, Lodge, and Lavine 2010). The concept of brute force effects of
candidates’ mass media presence and social media activity is simply a theoretical
extension of the mere exposure effect in the context elections. If mere exposure
increases familiarity, and with familiarity comes positive attitude, then, in the
setting of elections, mere exposure should translate into positive electoral effects.
This means that, with the concept of brute force effects, we are describing the
expected empirical consequence of the mere exposure effect in the context of
elections.
Our model of voting behavior can be summarized as a combination of rational
and non-rational voting, whereby brute force effects form a subset of non-rational
voting. We argue that non-rational voting, by which we mean voting that is not
only a pure function of individual fixed preferences, is a large part of overall voting
behavior. Brute force effects as the consequences of the mere exposure heuristic is
a subset of non-rational voting. However, we believe that brute force effects form
only a minor part of non-rational voting. This rationale is depicted visually in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Visual depiction of brute force effects within the sets of rational and non-
rational voting.
R NR
BF
Explanation: R stands for the set of rational voting, NR for the set of non-rational voting,
and BF for the subset of brute force effects.
There are two main sets in Figure 1, the set of rational voting and the set of
non-rational voting. There is an area of overlap among those sets (light gray area).
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This overlap symbolizes the fact that there is not only purely rational and purely
non-rational voting, but also voting that is rational in principle, but affected by
non-rational mechanisms, such as heuristics. Brute force effects are a subset of non-
rational voting – all voting affected by brute force effects is non-rational. However,
not all voting affected by brute force effects is necessarily purely non-rational. It is
also possible that voting that is rational in principle is affected by brute force effects
(dark gray area). The visualization in Figure 1 does not empirically quantify the
size of brute force effects, but is contains information that expresses our assumption
about the magnitude of brute force effects. Brute force effects, we believe, are
only a minor part of all non-rational voting. Furthermore, we believe that brute
force effects do not have to be total and exclusive effects: Voters can very well be
rational for the most part and be affected by brute force effects in addition to their
rational, preferential voting.
Overall, then, we posit that brute force effects of candidates’ mass media
presence and social media activity are only a minor part of overall voting behavior.
We do so for two reasons. First, as we argue above, brute force effects are only
a subset of non-rational behavior. Furthermore, there is broad consensus that
media effects do exist, but that they are generally small effects, if not minimal ones
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008). Our assumption about the magnitude of brute force
effects, then, is both conceptually and empirically motivated.
2.1 Existing research
There is a growing body of research that is interested in finding out how social
media is used in electoral campaigns, and what results from it (Kreiss 2015; K. M.
Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen 2014). Social media tends to have a vox populi
signaling effect, in that what is visible on social media is presumed to represent
public opinion. For example, journalists are prone to this kind of heuristic (Anstead
and O’Loughlin 2015), whereby anecdotal evidence is generalized as indicative of
public opinion.
However, more systematic analyses of the connection between social media and
elections have yielded more robust and relevant results. One prominent question
that has been explored in recent years is whether data from social media has any
form of potential predictive power for electoral outcomes (Metaxas, Mustafaraj, and
D. Gayo-Avello 2011; Daniel Gayo-Avello 2012; Daniel Gayo-Avello 2013). Even
though the present evidence for the predictive power of social media is far from
conclusive, the general idea is not without merit. Samples of social media users can
be thought of as an extreme form of non-probability sampling (Baker et al. 2013).
This will become ever more the case as social media penetration rates continue to
climb and encompass most population segments and strata.
The literature on predictive power of social media is certainly relevant in and
of itself, but it is only tangentially related to the concept of brute force effects.
However, there actually is a small, less prominent body of literature that has
explored potential brute force effects of social media activity on electoral outcomes.
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These studies did not operate with the concept of brute force effects, but what
they analyzed are possible brute force effects as we define them in this study. The
results of those studies are generally mixed, as Jungherr (2016) summarizes. Some
studies find no effect at all (Marcinkowski and Metag 2013; Jungherr 2013). Other
studies do find an effect, but a rather modest one, in that the relevant question is
not so much how active candidates are on social media, but rather whether they are
present on social media at all (Gibson and McAllister 2011; Kruikemeier 2014). A
number of studies report that the degree of activity on social media, either directly
by candidates themselves or indirectly through other users reacting to candidates,
matters (Spierings and Jacobs 2014; Jacobs and Spierings 2016; DiGrazia et al.
2013).
These studies, however, have two shortcomings. First, they analyze only the
social media platform Twitter. Twitter matters, of course, but using Twitter as a
pars pro toto for social media in general is, at the very least, not something that
is self-explanatorily plausible. Second, those studies either completely disregard
traditional mass media, or, if they don’t, they work yet again with a pars pro
toto strategy by generalizing a single media outlet as representative for all media
outlets in the given polity. With the present study, we aim to continue the valuable
research trajectory outlined by these studies, and we take steps to address the two
shortcomings in the literature.
2.2 The Swiss electoral system: A precise seismograph of
voter preferences
The Swiss federal parliament consists of two chambers, an upper and a lower house.
The upper house consists of 46 members who are representatives of the Swiss
cantons, polities similar to states in the United States. Members of the upper house
are elected by majority vote. The lower house consists of 200 members who are
elected by proportional vote. For the lower house election, Cantons are the voting
districts, just as they are for the upper house elections. In the present study, we are
interested in the lower house elections that are carried out by proportional vote.
The election of the Swiss federal lower house is carried out both on a party
and individual candidate level. The starting point for voters to vote are individual
voting lists that, by and large, correspond to different political parties. Every voter
has the right to vote for one voting list. In principle, the amount of voting lists
per voting district, i.e., per canton, is not limited. In 20 of the 26 Swiss cantons,
any political party, loose group or even singular candidate can register as a voting
list if they manage to gather enough signatures in a petition prior to the election1.
In the remaining six small cantons that only have one seat in the lower house,
no signatures have to be collected for candidacy eligibility2. The majority of the
1The number of signatures required for a candidacy varies according to the cantonal population
sizes, but does not exceed the relatively low amount of 400.
2In four of these small cantons, any one Swiss citizen from the respective canton is eligible to
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seats of the lower house, 194 out of 200, are allocated in voting districts where
proportional voting actually takes place3. The Swiss proportional electoral system,
however, is not limiting to choosing only among the voting lists (i.e., among the
parties). The voting lists actually only contain the pool of registered candidates,
and voters are free to choose among those candidates whatever way they wish. This
means that voters are allowed to remove candidates from a list, add candidates
from other lists, or even give individual candidates two votes. The latter procedure
is referred to as “cumulation”, and adding candidates from other lists is known
as “panachage”. Cumulation and panachage give voters great flexibility, but those
procedures are limited. First, only candidates who are within the overall pool
of pre-registered candidates are eligible for cumulation and panachage. Second,
a single voter is only allowed to cumulate two votes per candidate. That means
that on a voter’s voting list, the same candidate name can only appear twice.
Furthermore, the maximum number of candidates per voting list as well as the
total amount of votes a voter allocates is fixed because the number of slots on
voting lists is fixed. For example, in the canton of Zurich, the 2015 voting lists
contained 35 slots, because the canton of Zurich occupies 35 seats in the lower
house of parliament. Therefore, a voter in the 2015 election could vote for at
most 35 candidates. It was not possible to add more than 35 candidates through
panachage, and it was not possible to cumulate a vote for a candidate more than
once. By cumulating a vote for a candidate, two of the 35 slots on the voting list
were allocated to that candidate.
The Swiss electoral system for proportional allocation of seats to the lower
house, thus, allows voters to express their preferences in a very precise manner.
Accordingly, the outcome of the election reflects this, metaphorically speaking,
seismographic quality of the electoral system. Not only is it known which candidates
are elected to the lower house and how many votes the candidates receive, but
there is also data on the amount of panachage as well as the amount of cumulation
votes each candidate receives. From the point of view of candidates, then, there
are four natural outcome variable of the lower house elections: Being elected into
office or not, the total amount of votes received, the amount of panachage votes,
and, finally, the amount of cumulation votes.
2.3 Hypotheses
In the preceding sections, we have, first, explained our voting behavior model of
bounded rationality with relation to brute force effects of candidates’ mass media
presence and social media activity. Second, we have briefly described the nature
of the Swiss electoral system of the lower house elections. If we apply the model
of brute force effects to aggregate electoral behavior with regards to the lower
be elected into the lower house, even without prior official registration of the candidacy
3In the six small cantons with only one seat per canton, the election, naturally, defaults to a
majority vote
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house elections, there are four outcome variables where brute force effects might,
in principle, materialize: The probability for a candidate to win a seat, the total
amount of votes a candidate receives, the amount of panachage votes a candidates
receives, and the amount of cumulation votes a candidate receives.
We assume that brute force effects are, generally, weak effects. This means that
the rational components of voting behavior, as well as non-rational components
other than brute force effects, will probably outweigh brute force effects themselves.
We do not expect brute force effects to be decisive factors neither for the probability
of a candidate receiving a seat in the lower house, nor for the total amount of votes
a candidate receives. We express these two expectations with the hypotheses H1
and H2:
• Hypothesis H1 : Brute force effects have no substantial impact on a candidate’s
probability of being elected into the lower house.
• Hypothesis H2 : Brute force effects have no substantial impact on the total
amount of votes a candidate receives.
In hypotheses H1 and H2, we are deliberately referring to substantial impact
instead of something like “no impact”. Assuming no effect means expressing a
belief in a null model, and we don’t think that null models are plausible under any
reasonable set of assumptions for the purpose of this study. What is interesting
and epistemically more plausible is analyzing what effects actually exist, and how
meaningful they are for the given research questions.
We consider brute force effects to have no substantial impact on election chances
as well as on the total amount of votes. However, we do think that brute force
effects can have non-trivial impact on the other two outcome measures of electoral
success, the amount of panachage and cumulation votes. In the model of bounded
voter rationality, we expect voter preferences to be, for the most part, fixed. But we
do believe that brute force effects play a role nonetheless: They have a mobilizing
effect on voters’ preferences on individual candidates. This means that voters
have, in principle, preferences about who they want to vote for, and the brute
force of candidate mass media presence and social media activity can “nudge”
voters into expressing those preferences. Functionally, this nudging function is the
same as nudging in the sense of choice architecture (Sunstein 2014; Thaler and
Sunstein 2009), but conceptually, of course, it only partly is (Brute force effects are
“side effects”, not the primary intention, of mass media presence and social media
activity.).
We express the expectation of brute force effects as mobilizing nudges in
hypotheses H3 and H4.
• Hypothesis H3 : Brute force effects have a substantial impact on a candidate’s
panachage votes.
• Hypothesis H4 : Brute force effects have a substantial impact on a candidate’s
cumulation votes.
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In hypotheses H1 to H4, we have expressed our expectations regarding the
impact of the brute force effect of candidates’ mass media presence in conjunction
with the brute force effect of candidates’ social media activity. But we don’t believe
that those two effects only occur together, but rather, that they are seperate effects.
In hypothesis H5, we express our expectation that, overall, one effect is stronger
than the other:
• Hypothesis H5 : The brute force effect of mass media presence is stronger
than the brute force effect of social media activity.
Even though social media are used ever more widely, mass media are still, as
we argue in the introduction, a public master forum. Mass media reach many parts
of the public, and thus, candidates’ mass media presence does as well. In contrast,
the candidates’ audience on social media is much more fragmented and self-selected
(Prior 2007). This means, in effect, that voters are more likely to notice candidates
in mass media serendipitously, while they notice them on social media because they
have already expressed interest in some candidates by “following” their social media
profiles. From the candidates’ point of view, mass media presence will simply reach
more people than social media activity.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Data collection
We analyze the final campaigning phase of the 2015 Swiss federal election in this
study. The elections took place on October 18, 2015, and we are analyzing the
period from September 19 up to and including October 17. For this time period
of the final four weeks, we collected data on candidates’ mass media presence as
well as their social media activity. The data for the dependent variables in this
study – whether a candidate was elected; total number of votes per candidate;
panachage votes per candidate, and cumulation votes per candidate – is provided
by the cantonal statistical office of Zurich.
Table 1: Dependent variables for the present study.
Variable mean SD
elected (yes/no) − −
total votes 16588.1 30973.0
panachage votes 8456.3 16795.2
cumulation votes7399.9 15175.3
Each variable is used as the dependent variable in one of the four models that are estimated.
The research units for this study are the candidates for the lower house of the
Swiss parliament in the canton of Zurich. Zurich is the largest voting district in
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Switzerland, because it is the largest canton in terms of population size. In the
canton of Zurich, there were 35 different voting lists4 with a total of 873 candidates.
We tracked the mass media presence as well as the social media activity of all 873
candidates in the canton of Zurich.
The main predictors in the present study are candidates’ presence in mass
media and candidates’ activity on social media. The mass media presence of
the candidates is a fairly straightforward variable: We count how often any one
candidate has been present in newspaper articles, in segments of television news
shows or in segments of radio shows between September 16 and October 17 2015.
The media sample that we analyzed is summarized in Table 8. We have performed
an automated content analysis within the statistical environment R (R Core Team
2015) on a sample of 11 newspapers, three television news shows and two radio
news shows. Additionally, we have manually counted the occurrence of candidates
in three television news shows on a regional television channel. We did not calculate
an intercoder reliability for these three shows because counting occurrences was
very simple: Two of the shows in question5 are political talk shows where two to
four guests appear and stay for the whole show. It was therefore very simple to
identify candidates. The third show is a short news show6 of around 15 Minutes in
length for which we had segment-by-segment video data available. This also made
counting occurrences manually very simple.
When a candidate was mentioned, quoted or had a direct appearance (in the
case of newspaper interviews and studio appearances on television news shows)
once or several times in an article or a broadcasting show segment, we counted
that as one occurrence. However, if a candidate was mentioned in, for example,
several separate newspaper articles in the same newspaper on the same day, we
counted that as multiple occurrences. For the radio and television news shows,
an explicit appearance of a candidate combined with with an explicit mention
of that candidate’s name was a necessary condition for counting an occurrence7.
The media sample for this study consists of titles that have a general, broad focus
for the whole German-speaking part of Switzerland as well as titles that are of
very regional character and mostly have a cantonal audience. In total, our media
sample resulted in 125 occurrences of candidates in broadcasting media, and 1460
4Most of those voting lists correspond to a political party. However, a few voting lists did
not directly represent political parties, but different types of political groups, some of them only
semi-serious, such as the “Anti PowerPoint Party”. Any one individual can form a voting list and
become a candidate in the canton of Zurich if they manage to collect 400 signatures from Swiss
citizens living in the canton of Zurich.
5“TalkTäglich” and “SonnTalk”
6“ZüriNews”
7We had access to the official database of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation. For each
segment in the news, the mentioned and quoted politicians are listed in the database. For
newspapers, we automatically extracted all politicians. For common names and all politicians
with more than ten mentions, we checked manually for false positives and subtracted them. The
newspaper articles were downloaded from the comprehensive Swiss Media Database (Schweizerische
Mediendatenbank).
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occurrences of candidates in newspapers.
We measure candidates’ social media activity in a fairly comprehensive manner.
First, contrary to many studies interested in social media and politics, we are not
analyzing solely Twitter as a pars pro toto for social media, but additionally, we
are analyzing candidates’ activity on Facebook as well. Second, we are interested
in two conceptual dimensions of candidate activity on each of those two platforms:
Direct activity by candidates and candidate resonance. Direct activity is that kind
of activity in which candidates directly take some action themselves. On Facebook,
direct activity is either posting some content on one’s wall, or sharing some other
content on one’s wall. Direct activity on Twitter is very similar: Candidates can
either directly “tweet” themselves, or “retweet” some other tweets. The dimension of
resonance is social media activity that is not initiated by candidates themselves, but
which can make candidates more visible. On Facebook, resonance consists of other
users liking, commenting on and sharing posts by candidates. Similarly, resonance
on Twitter consists of other users liking, retweeting or replying to candidates’
tweets. To measure the resonance on Twitter, we tracked the user handles of all
politicians to capture the number of replies a politician received. The number of
received retweets and likes (favorites) could be accessed over the candidates’ wall.
The different components of social media activity are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Components of social media activity.
Platform Variable Component Type
Facebook direct activity posts (incl. shares) count
resonance likes count
comments count
shares count
Twitter direct activity tweets (incl. retweets) count
resonance likes count
retweets count
replies count
In order to collect social media data, we proceeded in two steps: First, we
manually identified candidates’ Twitter accounts and Facebook pages, and second,
we automatically extracted data from those accounts and pages. For Twitter, we
manually checked for every one of the 873 candidates whether a Twitter account
exists for them. The criteria applied for identifying Twitter accounts are the
following:
• A candidate’s first and last name had to be present.
• In addition, at least one of the following additional conditions had to be
satisfied:
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– Their political affiliation was mentioned in their Twitter profile.
– They tweeted about their political affiliation in the analyzed time period.
The identification of candidates’ Facebook pages was similar. We manually
searched for public Facebook pages of all 873 candidates. The identification criteria
for Facebook pages and profiles are the same as the above ones for Twitter, only
applied to Facebook. In total, 282 candidates had a Twitter account, and 138
candidates had a Facebook page.
We downloaded candidates’ tweets from their user walls in an automated fashion
within the computational environment R (R Core Team 2015). Furthermore, we
regularly searched for all Twitter handles through the Twitter Search API in order
to capture all replies to candidates’ tweets. Using this approach, we were able
to avoid issues that arise when using the Twitter Stream API (Bessi and Ferrara
2016). With the help of regex functions, we extracted only the replies to tweets by
candidates, and we filtered out mere mentions of candidates that are not replies to
candidates’ tweets. With this approach, it was possible to compare the Twitter
data to the Facebook data, since the data from the Facebook pages downloaded
via the Facebook API does not contain information about mentions elsewhere of
Facebook.
Overall, we are using six variables as independent variables of mass media
presence and of social media activity. Two of those independent variables are related
to mass media presence: The number of candidate occurrences in newspapers, and
the number of candidate occurrsences in broadcast news shows. For social media
predictors, we end up with four variables: One variable of direct activity and one
of resonance for Facebook and Twitter each. The two variables of direct activity
on social media are simply the counts of candidates’ Facebook posts (including
shares) and Twitter tweets (including retweets). The two variables of social media
resonance are composite variables. For Facebook, they are the sum of the counts
of likes, comments and shares by other Facebook users. For Twitter, they are the
sum of the counts of likes, retweets and replies by other Twitter users. In the time
period covered by this study, the candidates have created 1595 posts on Facebook
and received 49869 resonance actions on their posts, and they have tweeted 7036
times and received 15887 resonance actions on their tweets.
In addition to two variables for mass media presence and the four variables
for social media activity, we have collected additional data about the individual
candidates. These additional independent variables are summarized in Table 3,
together with the variables for social media activity.
Candidates’ gender (Dolan 2008; Mcdermott 1998) and age (L. Sigelman and
C. K. Sigelman 1982; Piliavin 1987) are variables that have been found to possibly
play a role in elections as a type of non-rational heuristic. The electoral advantage
of incumbents has been observed for some time and in different contexts (Erikson
1971; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Hogan 2004; Smith 2013; Ansolabehere and Snyder
2002). The voting list rank is a variable that captures the name order on the voting
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Table 3: List of independent variables.
Variable Type Level mean SD
gender nominal individual −
age metric individual 44.6 15.2
incumbency nominal individual −
voting list rank ordinal individual 17.2 10.1
voting list nominal group −
Presence - newspapers count individual 1.7 5.3
Presence - broadcasting count individual 0.1 0.9
Facebook - direct activity count individual 1.8 7.9
Twitter - direct activity count individual 8.1 44.0
Facebook - resonance count individual 57.1 555.1
Twitter - resonance count individual 18.2 109.0
lists. Name order has been found to have a non-trivial effect on voting outcomes
(Ho and Imai 2008; Koppell and Steen 2004; Miller and Krosnick 1998). Name
order effects are a very clear type of non-rational, heuristic driven voting behavior.
The voting list variable is included in order to denote the group level variable for
the multilevel modeling strategy (subsection 3.2).
3.2 Data analysis
The data as described in subsection 3.1 is of a particular structure. We have
collected data on 873 candidates, and those candidates are members of 35 different
voting lists. Our data, therefore, has a natural multilevel structure to it. Of
course, the data analysis strategy should not be determined only by “accidental”
properties of the data at hand, but it should be informed by epistemically reasonable
assumptions. We believe our assumptions meet this requirement. The 35 different
voting lists represent a wide range of parties, from relatively large ones that have
been present in the Swiss federal lower house for decades, to very minor parties
and groups that are not very well known. If we pooled all candidates together,
we would be committing a rather grave base-rate fallacy (Bar-Hillel 1980): Given
our prior knowledge on, for example, how well different political parties did in the
last elections of 2011, it would be fairly irrational to assume that in this election,
candidates of all parties would have an equal base-rate probability of being elected.
For this reason, we are modeling our estimates as multilevel models with varying
intercepts: We want to estimate effects of the predictors summarized in Table 3
given our strong expectation that not all parties, i.e., not all voting lists, would
do equally well absent all predictors. In other words, we believe that voters have
preferences, and those preferences, in the sense of rational voting, mostly determine
the electoral outcome, and not our set of independent variables. All of this is simply
a consequence of our theoretical understanding of voting behavior as explicated in
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section 1.
We conduct the data analysis as Bayesian multilevel models using Stan (Car-
penter et al. 2017) called via the package brms (Bürkner 2017) from within the
computational environment R (R Core Team 2015). We are using a Bayesian
procedure for practical as well as philosophical reasons. Practically, Bayesian
regression models perform better than frequentist regression models when the data
in question has a multilevel structure (Browne and Draper 2006; Gelman and Hill
2006; Stegmueller 2013; Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Philosophically, the beliefs that
are expressed via Bayesian models and the results that Bayesian models produce
are more closely aligned to our actual beliefs and our interpretation of parameter
estimates than is the case with frequentist models (Morey et al. 2016).
We estimate four models, corresponding to the four dependent variables of
interest: Being elected, the total amount of votes, the amount of cumulation votes,
and the amount of panachage votes. In the first of those models, the dependent
variable is dichotomous. The model we estimate is the following one:
yi,j ∼ Bernoulli(µ)
µ = logit(αi,j + βixi)
αi,j ∼ N (αi, τ)
αi ∼ N (0, 5)
τ ∼ Cauchy(0, 2.5)
βi ∼ N (0, 5)
In this model, i stands for the level of the individual candidate, and j denotes
the group level variable, the voting list. We estimate the other three models in the
following manner:
yi,j ∼ t(µ, σ, ν)
µ = αi,j + βixi
αi,j ∼ N (αi, τ)
αi ∼ N (0, 10 000)
τ ∼ Cauchy(0, 2.5)
βi ∼ N (0, 10 000)
σ ∼ Cauchy(0, 2.5)
ν ∼ Gamma(2, 0.1)
For the parameter estimates in all models, we apply only vaguely informative
priors. Even though we have suspicions about the model parameters – hence our
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hypotheses – , we do not think that those suspicions rise to the level of information
that should be included in the model as prior information.
In our latter three linear models, we do not model the noise distribution as a
normal distribution, but rather as a student’s t distribution (Lange, Little, and
Taylor 1989; Zhang et al. 2013). While the normal distribution is computationally
simpler and, generally, more often used in regression modeling than the t distri-
bution, the t distribution has the advantage of being more robust against outliers
(Kruschke 2014). When using the t distribution, it is necessary to specify its scale
parameter ν (read “nu”). We do not give that parameter a fixed value, but, again,
vague priors, as suggested by Juárez and Steel (2010).
Before estimating the models, we have standardized all independent variables
that are not nominal by re-scaling it relative to their mean and standard deviation.
Doing so has two advantages. First, rescaling the data makes the MCMC sampling
more efficient. Second, the results become a little more meaningful: The parameter
estimates indicate the effect that an independent variable in the model has when it
changes by one standard deviation.
An important component of Bayesian estimation is deciding when to stop
drawing samples and assume that the stationary distribution of the samples drawn
approximates the posterior distribution. Our sampling strategy is two-fold. First,
we report the potential scale reduction factors (Gelman and Rubin 1992) for all
estimates, with the goal that Rˆ (for the sake of brevity, the potential scale reduction
factor is denoted as Rˆ) be close to 1. Second, we present the posterior distribution in
visual form in Appendix B in the appendix. A visual inspection can give additional
insight into how well the different sampling chains converged.
For all models, we have drawn samples from four sampling chains. For each
chain, we drew 2 000 warmup iterations and 2 000 sampling iterations. This modest
amount of samples proved good enough for all models except one: For the model
of hypothesis 4 where the number of cumulation votes is the dependent variable,
we drew 3 000 warmup iterations and 3 000 sampling iterations. This increase in
iterations yielded an acceptable level of convergence.
4 Results
In the following subsection, we present the estimation results for the four models of
interest. For the hypotheses one to four, one model per hypothesis was estimated.
We present the results in tabular form. Graphical summaries of the posterior
distributions of the model estimates are presented in Appendix B.
4.1 Hypothesis H1: Being elected into office
For the first hypothesis, the dependent variable is dichotomous: Either a candidate
is elected into office or not. The estimation results for the first model are summarized
in Table 4.
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Table 4: Estimates of the first model. The dependent variable is the dichotomous election
outcome of being elected or not.
Parameter Mean 2.5% quantile 97.5% quantile Rˆ
Presence - newspapers 1.19 0.54 1.98 1.00
Presence - broadcasting −0.10 −0.68 0.56 1.00
Activity - Facebook −0.24 −0.88 0.38 1.00
Resonance - Facebook 0.58 −0.28 1.61 1.00
Activity - Twitter −0.72 −2.54 0.29 1.00
Resonance Twitter 0.68 0.09 1.59 1.00
Voting list rank −1.10 −2.49 0.00 1.00
Incumbency 4.08 2.11 6.18 1.00
Age 0.15 −0.72 1.09 1.00
Gender (female) 2.02 0.47 3.81 1.00
Note: The range between the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles is the so-called 95% credible
interval (CI). Given the data, there is a 95% probability that the parameter of interest lies
in this range. Credible intervals are not the same as frequentist confidence intervals; the
latter are oftentimes, incorrectly, interpreted as the former (Hoekstra et al. 2014).
The interpretation of the results is not directly intuitive, because the reported
values are log odds. Nonetheless, it is immediately visible that there seem to be
only a few estimates that are of practical relevance. The strongest effect on display
is incumbency: If a candidate is an incumbent, that translates into a log odds of
4.08. Or, converted into an odds ratio by means of exponentiation: If a candidate
is an incumbent, his or her odds of being elected are around 59 times higher than if
they weren’t an incumbent. Of the 873 candidates, 29 were incumbents. Of those
29, 24 got reelected – and only 11 of the 844 other, non-incumbent candidates got
elected. The second effect of practical importance is sex: Female candidates are
more likely to be elected than male ones, with log odds of 2.02, which translates
to an odds ratio of about 7.5. Finally, presence in newspapers as an effect of 1.19,
which translates into an odds ratio of 3.3. This means that one standard deviation
of newspaper presence, presence 5.3 articles, has a non-negligible impact on being
elected.
Overall, the first hypothesis is only partly supported. Contrary to the hypothesis,
one aspect of brute force effects, the presence in newspapers, does have a positive
non-negligible impact. Even though the effect is rather small, it cannot be ignored.
Overall, hypothesis H1 is only partly supported by the evidence. The effects of
presence in broadcasting media, social media activity and social media resonance
are all either small, inconsistent, or both. Presence in newspapers, however, is
not: Being present in a newspaper article increases a candidate’s odds of being
elected to around 1.27; this effects posterior distribution lies almost completely in
the positive range.
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4.2 Hypothesis H2: Total amount of votes
For the second hypothesis, the dependent variable is the total amount of votes. The
summary of the model estimates that tests hypothesis H2 is reported in Table 5.
Table 5: Estimates of the second model. The dependent variable is the total amount of
votes.
Parameter Mean 2.5% quantile 97.5% quantile Rˆ
Presence - newspapers 714.69 492.91 936.33 1.00
Presence - broadcasting 345.04 −30.04 604.57 1.00
Activity - Facebook −63.73 −132.59 18.09 1.00
Resonance - Facebook 1213.55 1084.55 1458.07 1.02
Activity - Twitter 38.35 −129.70 246.29 1.00
Resonance - Twitter −9.48 −187.67 206.69 1.00
Voting list rank −210.21 −244.47 −176.26 1.00
Incumbency 17012.03 15969.69 18029.76 1.00
Age −9.21 −43.03 25.07 1.00
Gender (female) 16.88 −42.00 78.15 1.00
Note: The range between the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles is the so-called 95% credible
interval (CI). Given the data, there is a 95% probability that the parameter of interest lies
in this range.
One estimate is immediately striking: If a candidate is an incumbent, he or she
will receive, on average, an additional 17012 votes. This finding goes hand in hand
with the one reported for the odds of being elected – there seems to be a strong
incumbency bonus in the Swiss lower house elections. A second noticeable effect is
Facebook resonance. An increase in one standard deviation of resonance, 555.1,
translates into an average of some additional 1213 votes. Presence in broadcasting
and in newspapers both have positive effects. An increase in one standard deviation
of broadcasting presence, 0.9, translates into an average of around 345 additional
votes. However, the 95% credible interval does not lie wholly in the positive region;
the posterior distribution’s lower end dips slightly into the negative range. An
increase in one standard deviation of newspaper presence, 5.3, translate into some
715 additional votes, on average. The effect of the voting list rank is slightly
negative; the lower the candidates are on the voting list, the fewer votes they
receive.
Overall, hypothesis 2 is only partly supported. The average amount of votes a
candidate received is around 16500, with a standard deviation of about 30900. In
light of these magnitudes, the brute force effects are, contrary to our expectation,
partly substantial. An increase in one standard deviation in newspaper presence
results in an average of about 750 additional votes, and an increase in one standard
deviation of Facebook resonance results in around 1213 additional votes – both of
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these effects are non-trivial.
4.3 Hypothesis H3: Amount of panachage votes
In hypothesis H3, we posit that mass media presence and social media activity will
increase the amount of panachage votes a candidate receives. The results of the
estimation for this hypothesis are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Estimates of the third model. The dependent variable is the amount of panachage
votes.
Parameter Mean 2.5% quantile 97.5% quantile Rˆ
Presence - newspapers 441.39 328.58 541.59 1.00
Presence - broadcasting 69.28 −14.45 139.56 1.00
Activity - Facebook −10.50 −40.82 23.26 1.00
Resonance - Facebook 178.21 8.89 302.81 1.01
Activity - Twitter 8.81 −22.45 71.55 1.00
Resonance - Twitter −1.30 −36.29 29.27 1.00
Voting list rank −80.82 −97.89 −64.35 1.00
Incumbency 6499.10 4852.06 8096.97 1.02
Age −7.43 −24.39 9.46 1.00
Gender (female) 25.15 −4.79 56.47 1.00
Note: The range between the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles is the so-called 95% credible
interval (CI). Given the data, there is a 95% probability that the parameter of interest lies
in this range.
Once again, the strongest effect by far is a candidate’s incumbency status:
On average, incumbents receive around 6500 more panachage votes than non-
incumbents. The second most notable effect is presence in newspapers. An increase
in one standard deviation of newspaper presence on average leads to some 440
additional panachage votes. Presence in broadcasting also has an average positive
effect for an increase in one standard deviation, 0.9, but the lower end of the
distribution dips into the negative, meaning that the effect is less consistent. Out of
the social media variables, resonance on Facebook is, once again, the only notable
effect. An increase in one standard deviation, 555.1, leads to around 178 additional
panachage votes on average. Voting list rank is, once again, displaying a small
negative effect: The lower the candidates are on the voting list, the fewer panachage
votes they receive.
The results only partly support hypothesis 3. Even though some of the brute
force variables do have a non-negligible effect, only presence in newspapers has an
effect that can be regarded as substantial. The average amount of panachage votes
per candidate is around 8400, and the standard deviation is around 16800. Within
such a context, about 440 votes gained from an increase in one standard deviation
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of newspaper articles can be relevant. Similarly, resonance on Facebook can also
have a smaller, but still substantial impact with an average of about 178 votes per
an increase in one standard deviation of resonance.
4.4 Hypothesis H4: Amount of cumulation votes
In hypothesis H4, we posit that the brute force effects of mass media presence
and social media activity will increase a candidate’s cumulation votes. Before
delving into the results, it is necessary to briefly explain why and how the amount
of cumulation votes candidates receive can be, and almost certainly is, biased. In
principle, every voter is allowed to cumulate votes for candidates, meaning that a
voter is allowed to place one candidate on a voting list twice. Most parties have
as many different candidates as they are allowed to have. In the Swiss federal
election of 2015, each voting list in the canton of Zurich could contain up to 35
candidates, because Zurich occupies 35 seats in the lower house. Most parties had
35 different candidates on their voting lists. Some smaller ones, however, did not
have 35 candidates, and some of those smaller parties put one or several candidates
already twice on their list.
Cumulating the potential votes in this manner by putting a candidate’s name
twice on a voting list a priori is completely legal, since, in the end, if a voter
decides not to change such a list, the voter has expressed his or her will to cumulate
votes for the candidates in question. In principle, then, this type of cumulation
is simply cumulation, nothing more. But in reality, this is a prototypical scenario
where a prominent cognitive heuristic, the status quo bias (Fernandez and Rodrik
1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), comes into play. The status quo bias is
the observation that people tend to disproportionately favor not changing things
over changing them. In the context of cumulation votes, it is highly probable that
voters will also favor the status quo, which means that those candidates whose
names are cumulated a priori are more likely to receive cumulation votes than
candidates whose names are not cumulated a priori. The nature of this kind of a
priori cumulation is, in the end, a case of non-rational voting through nudging.
Nonetheless, it is worth to have a look at the estimation results, even if there
is some bias present with the dependent variable. The results are summarized in
Table 7.
Once again, incumbency has the strongest effect. On average, incumbents
receive around 5812 additional cumulation votes. Furthermore, the presence both
in broadcasting as well as in newspapers has a positive effect. On average, an
increase in one standard distribution of broadcasting presence, 0.9, leads to around
113 additional cumulation votes, and an increase in one standard deviation of
newspaper presence, 5.3, leads to around 165 additional cumulation votes. Among
the social media variable, only resonance on Facebook has a notable effect. An
increase of one standard deviation of Facebook resonance, 555.1, leads to around
150 additional cumulation votes. Also, as with the previous models, voting list
rank has a small negative effect.
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Table 7: Estimates of the fourth model, with the amount of cumulation votes as the
dependent variable.
Parameter Mean 2.5% quantile 97.5% quantile Rˆ
Presence - newspapers 164.88 88.19 244.05 1.02
Presence - broadcasting 113.40 2.23 211.94 1.10
Activity - Facebook −9.49 −32.84 16.67 1.00
Resonance - Facebook 149.69 −8.19 272.69 1.02
Activity - Twitter 17.97 −32.29 85.84 1.01
Resonance - Twitter −14.80 −73.23 38.04 1.00
Voting list rank −58.42 −69.78 −47.44 1.00
Incumbency 5811.99 4222.20 7854.54 1.03
Age −6.92 −18.85 5.00 1.00
Gender (female) 18.64 −3.13 40.01 1.00
Note: The range between the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles is the so-called 95% credible
interval (CI). Given the data, there is a 95% probability that the parameter of interest lies
in this range.
The results do not support hypothesis 4. The average amount of cumulation
votes each candidate received is around 7400, with a standard deviation of around
15100. The brute force effects of mass media presence and social media activity are
all too small to be considered substantial. The strongest effect, an additional 165
votes, on average, by an increase in one standard deviation in newspaper presence
(5.3 articles), is fairly small.
4.5 Hypothesis H5: The force is stronger with mass media
presence
In our final hypothesis H5, we posit that the brute force effects of mass media
presence are stronger than the brute force effects of social media activity. Given
the results of the models described above, this seems to be the case. From the two
variables of mass media presence, the presence in newspaper articles displays a
consistent effect: Newspaper presence slightly increases candidates’ odds of getting
elected, and it increases the amount of total votes, the amount of panachage votes,
as well as the amount of cumulation votes. There are also signs that presence
in broadcasting has a positive effect, but the effect is, overall, somewhat weaker
and less consistent than newspaper presence. Among the social media variables,
only resonance on Facebook has produced relevant effects. But those effects are
consistent and, for one model, the total amount of votes, Facebook resonance is
even the strongest brute force effect.
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5 Discussion: Brute and forceful, but not quite as
expected
The results of our analysis of the 2015 Swiss federal election, naturally, only paint a
partial picture of brute force effects of candidates’ mass media presence and social
media activity. But that picture, we believe, is mostly plausible, and at least to
some degree generalizable beyond the context of Swiss elections.
We started out with the general expectation that brute force effects are minor
effects. Our results are very much compatible with that assumption: Even in
scenarios where brute force effects are potentially maximized, they are unlikely
to completely make or break an election. But at the same time, they are also
non-trivial. Within a given voting list, candidates sometimes receive very similar
amounts of votes, and a several hundred to a few thousand potential additional –
or missing – votes can make a difference in terms of electoral prospects if several
candidates are competing closely.
However, the impact of brute force effects did not play out exactly as we
expected in our hypotheses. In the context of the first hypothesis, we actually
observed an effect, namely that of presence in newspapers, that does constitute a
non-trivial impact. The results for the second hypothesis are surprising: Contrary
to our expectation, the effects of mass media presence and social media activity
were substantial. Specifically, the effects of newspaper presence and of Facebook
resonance are strong. The results for the third hypothesis were consistent with our
expectation. Specifically, the effects of newspaper presence and Facebook resonance
have a relatively strong impact. The results for the fourth hypothesis, however,
only partly support the hypothesis. Mass media presence and social media activity
does have a number of consistent effects, but they have, at best, a modest impact.
The final hypothesis was supported by the results. Overall, the effects of mass
media presence are stronger and more consistent than the effects of social media
activity.
Overall, and contrary to our expectations, possible brute force effects are not
only present for the amount of panachage and cumulation votes, but also for the
total amount of votes as well as the odds of getting elected. Those effects are only
present for mass media presence, not for social media activity and resonance. This
forms an important general insight of the present study: In the context of brute
force effects, traditional media still matter, and they matter a lot. That is not to
say that social media is not important, both for candidates and for voters. But
professional journalistic mass media still exert a centripetal force whereby large
parts of society become informed. Consequently, it is unlikely that professional
mass media will become obsolete for political campaigning anytime soon. It is
important, we believe, to try and keep such a “global” perspective in mind when
conducting research in the context of politics and social media. It is tantalizing to
conduct research exclusively within the context of social media, not least because
it is often easier to collect social media data than mass media data. However,
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social media should not be analyzed in total isolation, and, furthermore, electoral
behavior should not be reduced to media effects, be they induced by mass or by
social media. That is precisely the rationale of our concept of brute force effects,
because they are only a minor, but a relevant part of voter behavior.
5.1 Social media: Resonance, not direct activity, matters
One of the most intriguing aspects of the results of this study is the unequal
impact of different social media variables. Facebook activity, Twitter activity and
Twitter resonance are, essentially, meaningless and inconsistent. However, Facebook
resonance has a consistent and substantial effect. There are two possible conclusions
that can be drawn from this result. First, in the Swiss context, Facebook might
matter more than Twitter as a platform for political candidates. Facebook has far
more monthly active users than Twitter in Switzerland (about 3.5 million compared
to 0.7 million, Statista GmbH 2017). Second, and more importantly, resonance on
social media might matter more than activity in general. This is, of course, rather
plausible. A candidate might be very active on social media, but if she or he has
no audience, then that activity will not, obviously, translate into votes. It is even
possible that candidates who are “desperate” will be more active on social media,
to no avail, since nobody is listening.
5.2 The electoral Matthew effect
In our models, the strongest predictor of electoral success was incumbency: Candi-
dates who are sitting members of the lower house do much better, on average, than
challengers. This electoral Matthew effect in the sense of Pr(e|i) > Pr(e|c), where
e stands for being elected, i for incumbent, and c for challenger, is no big surprise.
After all, we specifically included incumbency as an independent variable because
it has been shown time and again that incumbency matters. How important,
then, could incumbency be in the context of brute force effects? Specifically, could
incumbency be a driver of mass media presence and social media activity? Indeed,
there is ample evidence that the incumbency bonus extends to mass media presence
(Hopmann, Vreese, and Albæk 2011; Green-Pedersen, Mortensen, and Thesen 2015).
The potential impact of the incumbency effect in the context of brute force effects
can thus be described as a two-step Matthew effect. First, incumbents receive more
air time and more presence in newspapers on account of their prominence. Second,
being more visible in the mass media, in turn, has an effect on voters, part of which
consists of brute force effects.
The incumbency effect as a two-step Matthew effect is, to some degree, a
double status quo bias. Incumbents enjoy a disproportionate amount of media
coverage because they are incumbents, and in turn, incumbents’ higher visibility as
a brute force effect strengthens voters’ general status quo bias as the preference for
incumbents. Given the data of this study, such a two-step mechanism is conceivable:
Incumbents commanded 55% of total candidate TV and radio presence, and 38%
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of total candidate newspaper presence – while being only a small minority of 3.3%
within the total candidate pool.
5.3 Limitations and future research
Our study has a number of limitations. First, we have conducted our analysis
only in the context of one election, and it is therefore impossible to say whether
the results are generalizable in a temporal (future elections in the same political
context) and geographical (elections in different contexts) manner.
A second major limitation is the question of how important the potential brute
force effects are for different parts of the public. Not all people have the same mass
media and social media repertoires and habits. It is therefore conceivable that a
much clearer picture of brute force effects would emerge if they were studied directly
by analyzing individual voting behavior instead of aggregated population-level
votes. For example, the effects of social media activity might be much stronger for
voters who are heavy users of social media and who rarely consume mass media.
Another limitation of this study is that we have condensed the analyzed time
period into a cross-sectional data set. Looking at brute force effects with a time-
series design would allow to extend the analysis to effects of intermedia agenda-
setting: It is possible that candidate mass media presence has a relevant impact on
their social media activity and resonance, and vice versa.
We encourage further research on the concept of brute force effects – with the
present study, brute force effects have been explored only tentatively in the context
of one single election. The general theoretical strategy we adopt in this study
should be pursued further. That is not to say that all future research has to rely
on exactly the same notions of bounded rationality, but we do think it necessary to
embed features of biase-prone human cognition, such as brute force effects, within
a more generalizable model of voter behavior.
That being said, we think there are two general ways future research could
further explore brute force effects. The first prospect for future research is quasi-
replication in different political contexts. By this we simply mean studying potential
brute force effects in a similar manner as we do presently, but for different political
contexts. After all, not all political campaigns, not all voting systems, and not
all mass media systems are the same. The second prospect for future research is
research with different research designs. As explained above, one major limitation
of our study is the fact that we did not have access to the micro-level of individual
voting behavior. That is precisely what should be in future research, be it in the
form of experimental or in the form of survey-type designs. Only then the exact
share of non-rational voting influenced by brute force effects can be estimated (see
Figure 1).
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5.4 Normative implications
The primary motivation for the present study is to put expectations that arise
from theory to the empirical test. Given our model of bounded voter rationality
and brute force effects as a form of non-rational voting behavior, we set out to
analyze whether the effects we expected are present. From our results, however,
some normative implications arise. Political decision-making by citizens should be
as rational as possible, and non-rational voting behavior as the result of cognitive
heuristics is therefore a normative problem. Consequently, brute force effects are
also a problem. How much of a problem? Not a great one, for at least two reasons.
First, we imagine brute force effects, conceptually, as only a minor part of non-
rational voting. Non-rational voting in general might be a problem (quantifying
the overall amount of irrational behavior in voting is way beyond the scope of the
present paper), but brute force effects of mass media presence and social media
activity are only a minor slice of that problem. Furthermore, our empirical results
support our theoretical assumption that brute force effects are, at most, moderate
effects.
Second, brute force effects are likely to be universal effects, since they are a
consequence of cognitive heuristics. Cognitive heuristics are a universal property of
human cognition, and therefore, the magnitude of brute force effects should be more
or less equally distributed among the population. That might hardly sound like
something to take solace in. But if brute force effects exist, then it is normatively
preferable that they be present and weak in the general population rather than
disproportionately concentrated within some population segments or strata.
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A Media sample
The television and radio shows as well as the newspaper titles analyzed in the
present study are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8: Media sample.
Medium type Title Geographic focus Description
Television TalkTäglich Regional Daily political talk show
SonnTalk Regional Weekly political talk show
ZüriNews Regional Daily news show
Tagesschau National Daily news show
10 vor 10 National Daily news show
Arena National Weekly political talk show
Radio Echo der Zeit National Daily news show
Regionaljournal Regional Daily news show
Rendez-vous National Daily news show
Newspaper Tages-Anzeiger National Daily newspaper
Neue Zürcher Zeitung National Daily newspaper
Blick National Daily newspaper
Blick am Abend National & regional Daily newspaper
20 Minuten National & regional Daily newspaper
SonntagsZeitung National Weekly newspaper
NZZ am Sonntag National Weekly newspaper
SonntagsBlick National Weekly newspaper
Zürcher Oberländer Regional Daily newspaper
Zürcher Unterländer Regional Daily newspaper
Zürichsee-Zeitung Regional Daily newspaper
Der Landbote Regional Daily newspaper
The newspapers “Blick am Abend” and “20 Minuten” are distributed nationally, but in
regional editions. We analyzed the Zurich editions in our sample.
The newspaper titles in the sample account for around 77% of total newspaper
circulation in the canton of Zurich, according to a non-profit corporation that collects
and verifies data an newspaper circulation (_wemf_2015). All newspapers with
medium and major circulation (75 000 and more) in the canton of Zurich are
contained in the sample, with the exception of the “Tagblatt der Stadt Zürich”,
which is not focused on politics. The selection criteria for the television and radio
titles are less straightforward. The selection of the television shows was pragmatic:
We have selected all regional and national news shows and political talk shows
that are available in the canton of Zurich. This resulted in a number of public
broadcasting news shows and political talk shows (“Tagesschau”, “10vor10”, “Arena”).
There is only one regional television channel with political news content, “Tele
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Züri”, and we have analyzed all news shows and political talk shows on that channel.
In the case of radio, we have only selected news shows on public broadcasting,
one of which focuses on regional content. Private radio stations in the canton of
Zurich are less listened to than public radio stations, and the amount and duration
news shows on private radio stations is kept to or near the regulatory minimum
(fög-Forschungsbereich Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft 2015).
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B Posterior distributions of the estimates
B.1 Posterior distributions of the estimates of the first model
Figure 2: Posterior probability densities of the parameter estimates for the first model.
The dependent variable is the dichotomous election outcome of being elected or not.
Age Gender
Voting list rank Incumbency
Activity - Twitter Resonance - Twitter
Activity - Facebook Resonance - Facebook
Presence - newspapers Presence - broadcasting
-2 -1 0 1 2 0 2 4
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 0 2 4 6 8
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 0 1 2
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Note: The different colors represent the four sampling chains; the better the overlap of
the four chains, the better the model convergence. The distribution shows the relative
proportion of samples that estimate the effect at some value, as depicted on the x-axis of
the parameter estimates.
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B.2 Posterior distributions of the estimates of the second
model
Figure 3: Posterior probability densities of the parameter estimates for the second model.
The dependent variable is the total number of votes.
Age Gender
Voting list rank Incumbency
Activity - Twitter Resonance - Twitter
Activity - Facebook Resonance - Facebook
Presence - newspapers Presence - broadcasting
-80 -40 0 40 -100 -50 0 50 100
-250 -200 -150 14000 15000 16000 17000 18000 19000
-200 0 200 400 -250 0 250 500
-200 -100 0 100 1000 1250 1500 1750
500 700 900 1100 0 400 800 1200
Note: The different colors represent the four sampling chains; the better the overlap of
the four chains, the better the model convergence. The distribution shows the relative
proportion of samples that estimate the effect at some value, as depicted on the x-axis of
the parameter estimates.
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B.3 Posterior distributions of the estimates of the third
model
Figure 4: Posterior probability densities of the parameter estimates for the third model.
The dependent variable is the number of panachage votes.
Age Gender
Voting list rank Incumbency
Activity - Twitter Resonance - Twitter
Activity - Facebook Resonance - Facebook
Presence - newspapers Presence - broadcasting
-40 -20 0 20 -30 0 30 60 90
-100 -80 -60 4000 6000 8000
-100 0 100 -100 0 100 200
-40 0 40 -200 0 200 400
200 300 400 500 600 0 100 200
Note: The different colors represent the four sampling chains; the better the overlap of
the four chains, the better the model convergence. The distribution shows the relative
proportion of samples that estimate the effect at some value, as depicted on the x-axis of
the parameter estimates. The distributions for resonance on Facebook and for incumbency
suggest a bimodal effect.
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B.4 Posterior distributions of the estimates of the fourth
model
Figure 5: Posterior probability densities of the parameter estimates for the fourth model.
The dependent variable is the number of cumulation votes.
Age Gender
Voting list rank Incumbency
Activity - Twitter Resonance - Twitter
Activity - Facebook Resonance - Facebook
Presence - newspapers Presence - broadcasting
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 0 25 50
-80 -70 -60 -50 -40 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
0 100 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100
-40 0 40 0 200 400 600 800
100 200 300 0 100 200 300
Note: The different colors represent the four sampling chains; the better the overlap of
the four chains, the better the model convergence. The distribution shows the relative
proportion of samples that estimate the effect at some value, as depicted on the x-axis
of the parameter estimates. Presence in broadcasting has one divergent chain, which
potentially suggests a bimodal effect. The distribution for incumbency is multimodal. The
general range of the effect, between around 4000 and 8000 votes, is plausible.
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C Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian param-
eter estimates
In this section, we compare frequentist and Bayesian parameter estimates. More
specifically, we present the frequentist point estimates estimated with the R package
lme4 (Bates et al. 2014) in tabular form with the estimates of the four Bayesian
models presented in our study. In addition, for models two to four, we present
the mean Bayesian estimates for our models two to four, but with the normal
distribution as a sampling distribution instead of student’s t distribution. The
frequentist point estimates and the Bayesian mean estimates using the normal
distribution are quite similar to one another, whereas the estimates of the models
with student’s t distribution are slightly different (smaller, for the most part).
This demonstrates the advantage of student’s t distribution for data that contains
outliers.
Table 9: Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian estimates for model one, with being
elected into office as the dependent variable.
Parameter Frequentist Bayesian (Bernoulli)
Presence - broadcasting −0.14 −0.10
Presence - newspapers 1.04 1.19
Activity - Facebook −0.23 −0.24
Resonance - Facebook 0.38 0.58
Activity - Twitter −0.04 −0.72
Resonance Twitter 0.31 0.68
Voting list rank −1.00 −1.10
Incumbency 3.87 4.08
Age 0.16 0.15
Gender (female) 1.99 2.02
Note: The distribution in the brackets is the sampling distribution used in the Bayesian
model.
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Table 10: Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian estimates for model two, with the
total amount of votes as the dependent variable.
Parameter Frequentist Bayesian (normal) Bayesian (student’s t)
Presence - broadcasting −269.14 −266.58 345.04
Presence - newspapers 3839.01 3842.17 714.69
Activity - Facebook 6.09 6.77 −63.73
Resonance - Facebook 733.75 735.72 1213.55
Activity - Twitter −190.47 −189.77 38.35
Resonance Twitter 126.38 125.53 −9.48
Voting list rank −757.44 −757.99 −210.21
Incumbency 10936.72 10879.96 17012.03
Age −6.70 −4.24 −9.21
Gender (female) 429.35 430.84 16.88
Note: The distributions in the brackets are the sampling distribution used in the Bayesian
models.
Table 11: Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian estimates for model three, with the
amount of panachage votes as the dependent variable.
Parameter Frequentist Bayesian (normal) Bayesian (student’s t)
Presence - broadcasting 274.86 276.52 69.28
Presence - newspapers 1630.37 1629.64 441.39
Activity - Facebook 472.87 473.11 −10.50
Resonance - Facebook 25.15 23.70 178.21
Activity - Twitter 12.78 12.72 8.81
Resonance Twitter 77.32 77.57 −1.30
Voting list rank −205.69 −206.10 −80.82
Incumbency 7105.07 7091.28 6499.10
Age 5.60 5.84 −7.43
Gender (female) 263.01 264.24 25.15
Note: The distributions in the brackets are the sampling distribution used in the Bayesian
models.
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Table 12: Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian estimates for model four, with the
amount of cumulation votes as the dependent variable.
Parameter Frequentist Bayesian (normal) Bayesian (student’s t)
Presence - broadcasting −536.22 −536.51 113.40
Presence - newspapers 2189.78 2191.01 164.88
Activity - Facebook −456.73 −455.90 −9.49
Resonance - Facebook 700.39 699.74 149.69
Activity - Twitter −194.24 −193.17 17.97
Resonance Twitter 34.42 34.39 −14.80
Voting list rank −564.14 −564.45 −58.42
Incumbency 3739.42 3727.27 5811.99
Age −1.97 −4.44 −6.92
Gender (female) 190.58 190.94 18.64
Note: The distributions in the brackets are the sampling distribution used in the Bayesian
models.
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D Election results
Figure 6 is a summary of the party-level election results.
Figure 6: Box plots for all parties with at least one elected candidate.
EVP
BDP
CVP
Grüne
glp
FDP
SP
SVP
50000 100000 150000
candidate votes
Pa
rty
Note: We created box plots for all parties that have at least one elected candidate. The
boxplots summarized the distribution of votes that individual candidates received in each
party.
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